The criminalisation of medical harm in the United Kingdom by Quick, Oliver
                          Quick, O. (2017). The criminalisation of medical harm in the United
Kingdom. In P. Mistretta (Ed.), Le droit français à l'aune du droit comparé:
pour un droit pénal médical rénové? (pp. 47-54). (Colloques & Essais).
Institute Universitaire Varenne.
Peer reviewed version
Link to publication record in Explore Bristol Research
PDF-document
This is the author accepted manuscript (AAM). The final published version (version of record) is available via
Institut Universitaire Varenne. Please refer to any applicable terms of use of the publisher.
University of Bristol - Explore Bristol Research
General rights
This document is made available in accordance with publisher policies. Please cite only the published
version using the reference above. Full terms of use are available:
http://www.bristol.ac.uk/pure/about/ebr-terms
 1 
Oliver Quick – The Criminalisation of Medical Harm in the UK (Lyon Colloquium April 2017) 
 
The Criminalisation of Medical Harm in the UK 
 
“FRENCH LAW FROM A COMPARATIVE LAW PERSPECTIVE: FOR AN OVERHAUL OF MEDICAL 
CRIMINAL LAW?”  
 
Symposium at Université Jean Moulin Lyon 3 – April 13-14 2017 
 
Dr Oliver Quick 
Senior Lecturer in Law 
University of Bristol 
United Kingdom  
Oliver.Quick@Bristol.ac.uk 
Medical Manslaughter 
The use of criminal law as a response to medical harm has been controversial in 
the UK.  Historically, this has been limited to occasional manslaughter prosecutions of 
practitioners for their ‘gross negligence.’ Whilst the term negligence is a familiar civil law 
concept, the gloss of ‘gross’ suggests a higher degree of carelessness worthy of criminal 
punishment. However, precisely what is meant by gross remains somewhat unclear. The 
leading case is that of R v Adomako [1994] 3 All ER 79 where a locum anaesthetist lost 
his appeal against conviction after failing to spot a disconnected oxygen tube during a 
routine eye operation which caused the patient’s death. Lord Mackay of Clashfern set out 
the following test of liability for manslaughter by gross negligence [at p. 86:] 
In my opinion the ordinary principles of the law of negligence apply 
to ascertain whether or not the defendant has been in breach of a duty of 
care towards the victim who has died. If such breach of duty is established 
the next question is whether that breach of duty caused the death of the 
victim. If so, the jury must go on to consider whether that breach of duty 
should be characterised as gross negligence and therefore as a crime. This 
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will depend on the seriousness of the breach of duty committed by the 
defendant in all the circumstances in which the defendant was placed when 
it occurred. The jury will have to consider whether the extent to which the 
defendant’s conduct departed from the proper standard of care incumbent 
upon him, involving as it must have done a risk of death to the patient, was 
such that it should be judged criminal. (my emphasis) 
 
To summarise, there are thus 4 elements to establishing manslaughter by gross 
negligence: 
(i) Duty of care 
(ii) Breach of that duty 
(iii) Causation 
(iv) Gross Negligence 
 
This is a circular test in that negligence will be gross, and thus criminal, if the jury 
thinks that it ought to be criminal. So if a jury asked how negligent must the D have been 
for this to be criminal, the answer is ‘so negligent as to deserve conviction for 
manslaughter.’ However, this has been affirmed by the Court of Appeal in the case of R v 
Misra and Srivastava [2004] EWCA Crim 2375 and is regarded (by the judiciary) as 
compliant with Art 7 ECHR.  Nevertheless, it remains an unduly vague concept that is 
incapable of objective measurement and consistent interpretation and is thus potentially 
unfair to those prosecuted (Quick 2006). Whilst there are other vague terms of criminal 
liability, the implications of such uncertainty are particularly serious in the context of 
homicide. Indeed, the imposition of manslaughter liability based on grossly negligent 
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conduct has long exercised legal philosophers. For example, Jerome Hall found this an 
‘inordinately troublesome’ area (Hall 1972: 959). Hall was rejecting H. L. A. Hart’s 
celebrated general theory of guilt in which he defended negligent criminal liability as part 
of a wider capacity theory of responsibility (Hart 1968: 147). For Hall, the imposition of 
such liability loses sight of the notion of blame, which should be the proper foundation of 
criminal law. In terms of contemporary criminal law scholarship, however, Hart’s view 
finds support from leading criminal law commentators (Ashworth and Horder 2013: 
181–85) and also the Law Commission, in their proposed formulation of ‘killing by gross 
carelessness’ (1996 and 2005).  Some have argued that a test based on recklessness 
would be more appropriate and might decrease the risk of weak cases being prosecuted 
(Quick 2006).  
Whilst such cases remain relatively rare (Brazier et al 2017), nevertheless, healthcare 
professionals fear the prospect of criminal prosecution and punishment. The conviction 
of Dr David Sellu on 5th November 2013 intensified such fears. The case against Dr Sellu, 
a 63-year-old colorectal surgeon working at a private hospital, was that he should have 
ordered a CT scan and operated sooner on a patient with a suspected perforated bowel 
who later died. The incarceration of Dr Sellu caused much consternation amongst the 
medical community, and prompted a group of colleagues to successfully campaign for his 
appeal (http://davidsellu.org.uk/supporters/).  On the 15 November 2016 the Court of 
Appeal allowed the appeal on the grounds that the trial judge’s direction did not permit 
the jury to ‘understand how to approach their task of identifying the line that separates 
even serious or very serious mistakes or lapses, from conduct which … was truly 
exceptionally bad and was such a departure from that standard [of a reasonably 
competent doctor] that it consequently amounted to being criminal (Sellu v The Crown 
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(2016) EWCA Crim 1716, para 152). This was connected to concerns that experts called 
by the prosecution were potentially usurping the role of the jury in appearing to 
determine the issue of ‘gross negligence’, an issue that has previously been identified as 
problematic in such cases (Quick 2011).   
Supporters of Dr Sellu also argued that insufficient attention was given to the clinical 
context of care, with the trial judge regarding it as an aggravating factor that treatment 
took place in a private hospital. Mr Justice Nicol noted that Dr Sellu’s negligence was not 
‘committed in the pressured circumstances of an acute NHS hospital where the stress of 
dealing with very many patients in an emergency condition can be particularly 
challenging’ (R v Sellu 5 November 2013). However, unlike NHS hospitals, private 
hospitals are not prepared to deal with such emergencies in terms of having appropriate 
clinicians on call to carry out specialist tests and procedures. It was reported that an 
internal investigation at the hospital found that its procedures for dealing with 
emergencies that developed after routine operations were not robust enough to prevent 
a systemic failure, and that this evidence was not disclosed at Dr Sellu’s trial. Such 
evidence is not only important in mitigating the culpability of individuals, but also raises 
the possibility of prosecuting organisations for serious systems failures. 
 
 
Corporate Manslaughter 
 
Criminal law has traditionally struggled with the idea and practicalities of 
prosecuting corporate entities, especially in terms of attributing responsibility (Wells 
2001). However, manslaughter prosecutions against organisations have been possible 
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since 6 April 2008, under the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007. 
Under Section 1 of the Act, organisations will commit homicide if the way in which it 
manages or organises its activities both cause a death and amounts to a gross breach of a 
relevant duty of care owed by the organisation to the deceased. In the case of healthcare 
organisations, there is little doubt that they will be under a duty of care towards patients; 
thus the key questions will, as with individual manslaughter liability, revolve around the 
grossness of the breach and to causation. Under Section 1(4) (b) a departure from the 
standard of care is gross if the conduct ‘falls far below what can reasonably be expected 
of the organisation in the circumstances’.  
Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells NHS Trust was the first NHS organisation to be 
prosecuted for the offence of Corporate Manslaughter. This followed the death of a 
woman at Pembury Hospital, Tunbridge Wells, after undergoing an emergency caesarean 
section in 2012. The prosecution alleged that the trust caused the patient’s death by a 
gross breach of duty of care by failing to take reasonable care to ensure: (i) the 
anaesthetists involved held the appropriate qualifications and training  and (ii)  that there 
was an appropriate level of supervision for the anaesthetic treatment of the deceased. 
However, two weeks into the trial, the judge ruled that there was no case for the trust or 
the anaesthetist to answer and directed the jury to return not guilty verdicts (The 
Guardian 28 January 2016). We thus await the first conviction of an NHS organisation for 
corporate manslaughter, which is likely to remain a challenge (Wells 2013). 
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Ill Treatment or Wilful Neglect 
Whilst the imposition of manslaughter liability has been widely criticised (McCall 
Smith 1993) the absence of a lesser offence for conduct causing harm short of death has 
long been questioned (Smith 1971). However, there are offences of ill-treating or wilfully 
neglecting patients, set out in Section 127 of the Mental Health Act 1983, Section 44 of 
the 2005 Mental Capacity Act, and Sections 20 and 21 of the Criminal Justice and Courts 
Act 2015.  The 2015 offences apply to care workers and care providers.  In order to be 
deemed a care worker for the purposes of the Act an individual must receive a salary for 
the care provided.  This means that care provided by family and friends is not covered by 
this offence.  Under Section 21, the liability of care providers (organisations) depends on 
determining that an individual has committed the care worker offence. These offences 
came into force on 13 April 2015 and have a maximum penalty of 5 years imprisonment 
or a fine (or both). 
Controversially, Sections 20 and 21 are conduct crimes not requiring proof of 
actual harm. It is arguable that neglecting or ill-treating patients is in itself harmful and 
worthy of potential punishment, irrespective of the actual harm to patients in question. 
The absence of a harm requirement also has practical advantages in avoiding the problem 
of proving the fault element in relation to the harm.  Inserting a harm requirement would 
have also encouraged unedifying arguments about whether the harm caused or risked 
was serious enough. It might also be said that clinicians and carers are already on notice 
that their patients are at risk. And the stronger the objective evidence of neglect, the 
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harder it will be for defendants to argue that they didn’t foresee this. Despite the absence 
of a harm requirement, in practice, prosecutions are more likely to follow in cases where 
ill-treatment or wilful neglect has actually caused tangible physical harm. 
Regulatory Offences 
UK Criminal law also contains a large number of offences that have been broadly 
labelled as regulatory. Recent examples include the creation of a number of offences in 
relation to breaches of various regulations enforced by the Care Quality Commission (the 
health sector regulator). These are covered in The Health and Social Care Act 2008 
(Regulated Activities) Regulations 2014 and The Health and Social Care Act 2008 
(Registration and Regulated Activities) Regulations 2015. Whilst the CQC has generally 
sought compliance, nevertheless, breach of certain regulations may be prosecuted 
without the CQC first issuing a warning notice. These include regulations in relation to 
consent, acting on complaints, good governance, duty of candour and requirement to 
display performance assessments. A defence to these offences exists where registered 
persons took all reasonable steps and acted with due diligence. An additional three 
regulations allow for criminal prosecution, but only where the breach results in exposure 
to avoidable harm or significant risk of such harm occurring. These are ‘safe care and 
treatment’, ‘safeguarding service users from abuse and improper treatment’, and 
‘meeting nutritional and hydration needs’. Whilst there is no doubt that the 
criminalisation of these safety breaches is symbolically important, it is less clear whether 
they will be effective in terms protecting patient safety (Stirton 2017).  
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Criminalisation and Patient Safety? 
 
Little is known about the relationship between criminal law and patient safety. To 
date, no research has examined how such prosecutions impact on the medical practice of 
those affected or on the policies of organisations. Does criminal law deter unsafe 
practices? Does it have a positive net effect on levels of safe care? These are difficult 
questions to answer, not least because there are different types of criminal offences and 
because the medico-legal and regulatory environment includes numerous mechanisms 
and influences on behaviour, making the task of isolating any effect of criminal offences 
difficult if not impossible. Nevertheless, the absence of hard evidence evaluating the 
actual impact of criminal prosecutions need not prevent discussion about the likely 
connection between criminal law mechanisms and the pursuit of patient safety. Criminal 
offences are not all the same and differ in terms of their design, implementation and their 
possible effect, including the effect they may have on efforts to improve patient safety. 
Whilst the use of criminal offences in this context has been dominated by concerns about 
accountability rather than deterrence, it would be premature to dismiss the possibility 
that the presence of criminal offences may help alter individual and organisational 
behaviour and thus play some role in securing safety. The deterrence argument needs to 
be carefully unpacked and considered in relation to specific offences. Deterring errors is 
difficult, given that genuine errors lead to the opposite of what an individual intended. 
But deterring intentional or reckless behaviour is a more realistic aim for criminal law. 
Likewise, organisational offences are more likely to lead to changes in policies and 
practices that can help improve safety. 
In terms of manslaughter, the educative role of such prosecutions, on those 
prosecuted and to the profession generally is not well understood. Nevertheless, such 
 9 
Oliver Quick – The Criminalisation of Medical Harm in the UK (Lyon Colloquium April 2017) 
 
cases do have the capacity to assist with efforts to learn from safety failures. Whilst 
manslaughter cases essentially focus on individual fault, they can nevertheless allow high 
profile attention to be given to the context of fatal errors. The extent to which such lessons 
are learnt, both by the individual concerned and the wider medical community is not well 
understood. Perhaps the individual in question is less likely to repeat the same mistake 
again, but the extent to which this alters the behaviour of others is unknown. The fact that 
manslaughter prosecutions often tend to revolve around the same safety issue, for 
example, medication errors, might tend to suggest that such prosecutions have little 
effect in terms of learning and prevention. Whilst there is no direct evidence, some have 
speculated that criminal law not only fails to deter, but may in fact fuel a culture of secrecy 
and shame about errors (Ferner and McDowell 2013). However, whilst occasional 
manslaughter prosecutions are likely to offer little or no promise in terms of improving 
patient safety, there are reasons to be more optimistic about the other offences explored 
in this presentation. 
Griffiths and Sanders are correct to note that the ‘prosecution (or threat of 
prosecution) of a larger number of cases where there has been deliberate disregard or 
recklessness, as well as gross neglect, promises much more of a deterrent effect than the 
prosecution of a few cases’ (2013: 154). Others have argued that such endangerment 
offences offer greater potential for a positive deterrent effect (Alghrani 2011). Whilst 
there is a lack of evidence to support this claim, nevertheless, a deterrent effect is more 
likely in the context of advertent as opposed to inadvertent harm. In particular, the 
offence in Section 21 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015, in targeting providers 
of care, should lead to greater attention to the implementation of policies that decrease 
the risk of patients being ill-treated or neglected. This could be related to safe levels of 
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staffing and increased monitoring of vulnerable patients for example. The threat of 
criminal prosecution should increase the pressure on organisations to have systems in 
place that minimise the risk of harmful outcomes. Ultimately, whether such offences 
actually have such an effect will depend on effective enforcement by the CQC and research 
that attempts to better understand the response of providers and professionals to such 
offences. Whilst criminal law is likely to play a minor role in the major task of improving 
safety, nevertheless, it would be wrong to dismiss it completely.  
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